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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATES
OF
CAROL BAILEY and
FRANCIS ANDREW BAILEY,
Deceased.
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Case No. CV -06-6496

--------)

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the
Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho
in and for Bonneville County
Honorable Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge, Presiding

REGINALD R. REEVES, ESQ.
Appellant's Attorney
Cambridge Law Center
PO Box 1841
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83403

MICHAEL J. WHYTE, ESQ.
Respondents' Attorney
THOMSEN STEPHENS LA W OFFICES, PLLC
2635 Channing Way, Idaho Falls, ID 83404
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent concurs with Appellant's statement of the case

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The only additional issue to be discussed is the payment of respondents' attorney fees on
appeal.

ARGUMENT
I. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT TIME
RECORDS FOR WORK PERFORMED ARE REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH WHETHER
ATTORNEY FEES ARE REASONABLE

The awarding of attorney fees is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and
should only be subject to reversal on appeal when there has been an abuse of that discretion. "An
abuse of discretion standard requires this Court to inquire as to: (1) Whether the Trial Court
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) Whether the Trial Court acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable with to the
specific choices available to it; and (3) Whether the Trial Court reached its decision by and
exercised of reason." Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Tucker, 142 Idaho 191, 193, 125 P.3d
1067 (2005); Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Company, 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803
P.2d 993, 1000 (1991).
In this case on appeal, after significant issues of contention and a trial between the
personal representative and the respondents, the respondents requested a final accounting be
provided by the personal representative and his attorney. This final accounting contained a line
item reflecting the attorney fees paid by the estate to the personal representative's attorney or
claimed as owing to the personal representative's attorney. After the trial court requested
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additional information to support the claimed attorney fees, appellant provided a written
agreement entered into between the personal representative and his attorney at, or prior to the
time the estate was opened. In this agreement, the personal representative agreed to pay his
attorney whatever the attorney deemed was a reasonable fee.
Appellant claims the trial court erred when it denied the award of fees pursuant to
I.R.C.P.54(e)(3)(A). Appellant suggests that LR.C.P. 54(e)(3)(L) is the more appropriate
standard and under that standard the trial court should have allowed the award of the claimed
fees in the final accounting. However, appellant ignores the language of both I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1)
and LR.C.P. 54(e)(3) that any award of attorney fees is discretionary with the court. Rule
54(e)(1) states: "In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees .... " This
language recognizes that attorney fees are not awarded or approved as a matter of right, but are
left to the discretion of the trial court. LR.C.P. 54(e)(3) also recognizes the discretionary nature
of attorney fee awards when it states "In the event the court grants attorney fees to the party.... ".
This language clearly states that the award of attorney fees under LR.C.P. 54(e)(3) is
discretionary. The trial court starts its review of the possible award of attorney fees by first of all
determining if fees should even be allowed.
Presuming the trial court determines that fees may be allowed, the next element reviewed
in determining whether an award of attorney fees is permissible under both LR. C.P. 54(e)(1) and
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) is whether the fees are reasonable.
The question of what constitutes a 'reasonable' attorney fee involves a
discretionary determination by the trial court. Spidell v. Jenkins, 111 Idaho 857,
727 P.2d 1285 (Ct.App.1986). In exercising this discretion, the court must act
consistently with the applicable legal standards listed in LR.C.P. 54(e)(3).
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Associates Northwest v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826
(Ct.App.1987).

Kelly v. Hodges, 119 Idaho 872 876, 811, P.2d 48,52 (Ct.App. 1991)

The Rule does not require the court to blindly accept the amount provided by the attorney
nor does it allow a blanket award of fees without more proof or information as to the
reasonableness. In this case, appellant did not provide any information to satisfY the trial court
that the claimed fees were reasonable. Without providing this information, the trial court, in its
discretion, could, and did determine that there was insufficient information to award the payment
of attorney fees.
Appellant further suggests the trial court erred in relying on I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) to deny the
claim for attorney fees. Appellant claims that the trial court should have analyzed the claim
using I.R.C.P. 54(e)(8). Rule 54(e)(8) states:
The provisions of this Rule 54(e) relating to attorney fees shall be applicable to all
claims for attorney fees made pursuant to section 12-121, Idaho Code, and to any
claim for attorney fees made pursuant to any other statute, or pursuant to any
contract, to the extent that the application of this Rule 54(e) to such a claim for
attorney fees would not be inconsistent with such other statute or contract.

The reliance on Rule 54(e)(8) is misplaced. This Rule applies to situations involving
disputing parties who are involved in actions to enforce the terms of the contract between them.
In those cases, there is additional contract language for the payment of attorney fees by the nonprevailing parties of those disputes. Appellants cite Zenner v. Holcomb, 147 Idaho 444,210 P.3d
552 (2009) as support for their position. However, the Zenner case involved a contract between
disputing parties that called for payment of "actual fees" to the prevailing party if the contract
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were disputed as opposed to "reasonable fees". Based on the language in the contract, the
appellate court held that the "reasonableness" criteria would be inconsistent and therefore the
criteria of Rule 53(e)(3) was not applicable. This is not applicable to this action before this
Court. In this current case, there is no contract between the disputing parties. The contract
appellant wants to use to avoid the Rule 53(e)(3) criteria is between the personal representative
and his attorney, not between the personal representative's attorney and the other beneficiaries.
The respondents are not a party to this agreement. The agreement referenced by appellant may
be binding and enforceable on the personal representative, but it is not binding on, and cannot be
used against, the respondents who were not parties to the agreement. The trial court did not error
in refusing to only rely on this retainer agreement between the personal representative and his
attorney when reviewing whether to award the claimed attorney fees.
Because the underlying action is a probate of an estate, the trial court reviewed the
probate code for direction in awarding attorney fees. The statute that applies for the payment of
attorney fees in probate actions is Idaho Code § 15-3-720.
"If any personal representative or person nominated as personal representative
defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, is
entitled to receive from the estate his necessary expenses and disbursements
including reasonable attorney fees incurred."
Idaho Code §15-3-720.
Appellant wants the court to just accept the appellant's attorney's own assessment as to
the value for the services claimed to have been provided without any inquiry into the
reasonableness. If this were an issue just between the personal representative and his attorney, it
might be acceptable to rely on the language of the agreement in allowing the attorney to set the
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amount. However, in this case, the personal representative wants his attorney fees paid by the
estate which will directly affect all beneficiaries. If the personal representative wants his attorney
fees paid by the estate, the claim for those fees is subject to Idaho Code § 15-3-720 and it is
within the court's discretion to determine whether the claimed fees are reasonable. Rule 54(e)(3)
is used by a court to assist it in determining the reasonableness of fees and involves a
discretionary determination by the court. Daisy Manufacturing Co. v. Paintball Sports, Inc., 134
Idaho 259,262,999 P.2d 914 (Ct. App 2000). "A court is permitted to examine the
reasonableness of the time and labor expended by the attorney under LR.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A) and
need not blindly accept the figures advanced by the attorney.... " Id at 262, citing Craft Wall of
Idaho, Inc. v. Stonebraker, 108 Idaho 704, 706, 701 P.2d 324,326 (Ct.App.1985). If the court is
to award attorney fees under Rule 54(e)(3), than it must have sufficient information at its
disposal concerning the factors Rule 54(e)(3). Some of these factors can only be provided by the
attorney.
We believe it is incumbent upon a party seeking attorney fees to present sufficient
information for the court to consider factors as they specifically relate to the
prevailing party or parties seeking fees. Streeter has failed to do this, therefore, we
find no error in the denial of a fee award to Streeter.
Hackett v. Streeter, 109 Idaho 261, 264, 706 P.2d 1372 (Ct. App. 1985).
In Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 86 P.3d 475

(2004), the appellate court overturned a district court award of attorney fees because the district
court was without sufficient information concerning the 54(e)(3) factors. In that case, Texas
Refinery was precluded from an award of a specific amount of attorney fees because it chose not
to provide time sheets to support the claimed fees. Because there was no underlying, supporting
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information for the claimed fees, the district court could not determine the reasonableness of the
claimed fees.
In this case, appellant's attorney wants the court to rely solely on his claim that the fees
are reasonable as satisfaction of the 54(e)(3) factors. However, the trial court used its discretion
to review the information provided and to determine that this claim was insufficient to satisfY the
Rule 54(e)(3) factors and, following the holding in Texas Refinery, determined that it could not
award the claimed fees. The court did not abuse its discretion by not blindly accepting the
requested attorney fees presented by personal representative's attorney without more information.
The trial court used its discretion to disallow the requested fees because there was no information
to assist the trial court to find that the claimed fees were reasonable using the Rule 54(e)(3)
factors.
In this case, it was incumbent on appellant and appellant's attorney to present sufficient

information for the court to consider the reasonableness of the fees claimed. Because that did not
occur, the court could not enter a finding awarding the claimed fees. There was no error in
denying the claimed fee.

II. THE CONTRACT WAS VALID

Appellant argues that the agreement between the personal representative was valid and
therefore, no other inquiry was necessary or required by the trial court. However, as indicated
earlier, it is not just a question ofthe validity ofthe agreement between the personal
representative and his attorney. The respondents are not a party to this agreement. The
agreement referenced by appellant may be binding and enforceable on the personal

6-

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF.

representative, but is not binding on, and cannot be used against, the respondents who were not
parties to the agreement. In addition, appellant's reliance on Zenner, is misplaced. The Zenner
case involved a contract between disputing parties. In this current case, there is no contract
between the disputing parties. The trial court did not error in refusing to only rely on this
agreement between the personal representative and his attorney when reviewing whether to
award the claimed attorney fees.

III. THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONSIDERED ONLY TIME INVOLVED
Appellant wants the Court to ignore LR.C.P. 54(e)(3) factors except for Rule 54(e)(3)(L)
to award fees. Rule 54(e)(3)(L) states the trial court may rely on "Any other factor which the
court deems appropriate in the particular case." First of all, the use of this factor is still left to the
discretion of the trial court in that it is left to the court to determine what is appropriate. In this
case, the trial court used its discretion to reject the information presented as not being
appropriate. This was not error.
Secondly, the court cannot consider "any other factor" of Rule 54(e)(3)(L) to the
exclusion of time and labor and the other factors.
Rule 54(e)(3) lists the factors which the district court "shall consider ... in
determining the amount of such fees." One factor is the "time and labor
required." The district court may also consider "[a]ny other factor ... appropriate
in the particular case." But the court may not focus upon such "other" factors to
the exclusion of the "time and labor" and the remaining factors listed in the rule.

DeWils Interiors, Inc. v. Dines, 106 Idaho 288, 290, 678 P.2d 80,82 (Ct. App. 1984); citing
Logosz v. Childers, 105 Idaho 173,667 P.2d 276 (Ct.App.1983).
The Court cannot look to the agreement between the personal representative and his
attorney to the exclusion of all other factors. The trial court did not error in reviewing the Rule
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54(e)(3) factors, including time and labor under Rule 54(e)(3)(A) and finding the appellant's
presentation of information insufficient to award attorney fees. The court did not err when it
concluded that it could not determine the reasonableness of claimed or requested attorney fees
without additional information and in denying the attorney fees when no additional information
was provided.

IV. COMPLIANCE WOULD HAVE REQUIRED VIOLATION OF IRPC 8.4(c)
Appellant was without the ability to submit the information requested by the court
because it cannot manufacture this information and stay in compliance with LR.C.P. 8.4(c). This
does not create error on the part of the trial court. Appellant chose not to retain information that
would satisfY the Rule 54(e)(3) factors. The Court did not abuse its discretion in that it gave
Appellant additional opportunities to provide more information prior to denying the fee award.
Appellant was unable to provide any additional information, and therefore the Court was unable
to award fees as requested.

V. BILLABLE HOURS - AN OUTMODED CONCEPT
Appellant provided a significant amount of information and articles outside of the
transcripts and court records. This information suggests a trend away from the standard billable
hour. Regardless of whether there is a "trend" away from the billable hour, awards of attorney
fees in Idaho is governed by the statutes as discussed above. The trial court made no error in
adhering to the rules.
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VI. QUANTUM MERUIT BILLING APPROVED
Appellant wants the Court to approve the requested attorney fees under the theory of
quantum meruit. In support of this argument, appellant cites Farrell v. Whiteman, 146 Idaho
604,200 P.3d 1153 (2009). However, this was not a case wherein the Court applied quantum
meruit to award or approval of attorney fees. The Farrell case was a case involving a disputed
agreement between two parties. It does not apply to this action.
Although quantum meruit has been used as a means of awarding equitable relief for
awarding value of services rendered, it is inapplicable to the determination of awarding or
approving attorney fees. As has been discussed throughout this brief, the award of attorney fees
is controlled by statute. Those statutes, including I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) provide the guidance to the
court to determine, in its discretion, whether fees are warranted and reasonable.

VII. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Respondent is entitled to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. §12-121. Appellant has
sought this appeal frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation.

CONCLUSION
The court did not error in using its discretion when it denied the award of attorney fees
because appellant failed to provide sufficient information required under Idaho Code § 15-3-720
and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3).
DATED this

5

day of December, 2011.
THOMSEN STEPHENS LA W OFFICES, PLLC

By:
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~q.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certifY that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the ~ day of December, 2011, I caused a true
and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF to be served upon the following
persons at the addresses below their names either by depositing said document in the United
States mail with the correct postage thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile
as set forth below.
REGINALD R REEVES
690 CAMBRIDGE DRIVE
PO BOX 1841
IDAHO FALLS ID 83403
FAX: 522-2516

[x] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

TIIOMSEN STEPHENS LA W OFFICES, PLLC

BY:~
~.
MJW:tlh

J :\data\MJW\6186\APPEAL\001 Respond. Brief. wpd
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